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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the presence of the third person? Thirdly, if the court had de-
termined the child competent as a third person, the problem of
whether both the child and husband could testify would arise. The
better view appears to be that the privilege is completely destroyed
as to a conversation made in the known presence of a third person
and therefore the husband should be allowed to testify via the tape
recordings. North Carolina follows the rule that the third person
either known or unknown to the spouses may testify, but whether
the spouse may in turn testify once the actual presence of a third
person has been established has not been decided. 4
A court should be zealous in protecting the privilege of con-
fidential communications which is intended to secure the perfect
confidence and trust which should characterize the relation of hus-
band and wife. However, the privilege protects only the institution
of marriage. It seems that the court in Hicks viewed the privilege
as covering the familial unit. The fact that the spouses intend their
conversations to be private and confidential seems immaterial when
spoken in the known presence of a third person, even if that third
person is a child. The court possibly considered the child such an
integral part of the marriage that she should not be considered a
third person. The real problem with the case is the failure of the
court to articulate the reasons for its decision, resulting in consider-




Multiple-party actions in the federal courts are susceptible to dis-
missal for want of jurisdiction because of the rule of complete di-
versity requiring that no plaintiff be a citizen of a state of which a
defendant is a citizen.- The jurisdiction of the federal courts over
suits "between citizens of different states"' seemingly contradicts
the basic tenets of federalism, for these suits involve rights grounded
"' Note 40 supra.
1 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
'28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1964).
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in state law cognizable in state courts." The federal courts have been
sensitive to this contradiction and have sought to "scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the [Ju-
diciary Acts have] defined." 4 In multiple-party actions, therefore,
the courts have been obliged to ignore the arrangement of the parties
on the pleadings and to take upon themselves the duty of realigning
the parties "according to their sides in the dispute."5 The commonly
accepted test for realignment is the "real" or "ultimate" interests of
the parties.' This refers to the parties' interests at law which may or
may not coincide with their interests in fact. In the case of corpora-
tions and their shareholders, however, the courts have recognized that
common interests and a common stance on the litigation do not al-
ways follow from common interests at law. In a stockholder's deriva-
tive action the corporation will not be realigned as a party plaintiff if
the court finds that it is under control "antagonistic" to enforcement
of the claim." In this class of actions the federal courts have substi-
tuted antagonism between the parties for the pattern of legal interest
as a basis for alignment and have thereby created an exception to the
ultimate interest test.8
This exception was expanded to non-stockholder actions in the
[Diversity jurisdiction] poses the deepest issue of the uses of the federal
courts. In these instances the jurisdiction is employed not to vindicate
rights grounded in the national authority but solely to administer state
law. . . . The problem is, therefore, whether this exceptional judicial
undertaking rests on some present, valid, federal purpose. If not, it is a
function that should plainly be surrendered....
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 235 (1948). Exercise of diversity jurisdiction has
occasioned considerable soul-searching among legal scholars. A furious
debate has raged over the question of whether the federal courts should con-
tinue to exercise jurisdiction over cases grounded in diversity, see H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
892-97 (1953); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT]; Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 22-28 (1948) ; Friendly, The Historic Basis of the
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928); Yntema & Jafin, Pre-
liminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. Rxv. 869, 873-76
(1931).
' Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ; accord, Indianapolis v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 77 (1941).
Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905).
1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26
at 14546 (Wright rev. 1960); WRIGHT § 30 at 83 (1963).
' Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957); Venner v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 209 U.S. 24 (1908); Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905); De
Pinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
'WRIGHT § 30 at 83.
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recent case of Reed v. Robilio.f The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to accept the identity of interest at law between an executor
and the sole heir as conclusive of alignment in an action brought
on behalf of the estate. The court held that the antagonism of the
executor to the heir's claim precluded realignment of the executor as
a party plaintiff.10 The plaintiff in Robilio was a citizen of New
York. Contending that the sum paid for her deceased father's in-
terest in a foods-processing partnership was grossly inadequate,'
the plaintiff demanded that the executors of her parents' estates bring
suit against the purchasers, her father's former partners and their
relatives. The executors refused to sue whereupon she brought this
action alleging breach of a partner's fiduciary duty. The executors,
citizens of Tennessee, were joined with the individual defendants,
also citizens of Tennessee. Although the complaint alleged no wrong-
doing on the part of the executors and sought no relief against them,
both filed answers which denied the allegations of the complaint and
asserted fairness of the transaction as an affirmative defense.12 Dur-
ing the trial, the executors acted as parties adversary to the plaintiff ."
The jurisdictional issue was not raised until the fifth week of the
trial on the trial judge's own motion.'4 The district court concluded
that the conduct of the executors was "inexplicable"'" but that it
'376 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'g 248 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Tenn.
1965).
* In the district court, the plaintiff joined the executor of her father's
estate, Planters National Bank of Memphis, and the executor of her mother's
estate, an attorney; but the executor of the mother's estate was discharged
prior to the appellate argument, and the court of appeals ordered dismissal of
the action as to him. 376 F.2d at 394. Thus only the bank's position in the
litigation was at issue before the court of appeals.
11 Pursuant to the father's will the bank as his executor undertook to sell
his interest in the partnership. Its trust officer negotiated the price and the
terms of the sale to the real defendants; the sale, and certain new partnership
terms, were approved by the plaintiff's mother, acting upon the advice of the
attorney who ultimately became her executor. 248 F. Supp. at 604.
12376 F.2d at 393.
31d. The executors submitted interrogatories to the plaintiff, objected
to the testimony of her witnesses and argued against her on points of law.
The bank went so far as to put its trust officer on the stand to testify in
support of the real defendants' position. 248 F. Supp. at 616.1 248 F. Supp. at 605.
" No reason is assigned in either decision for the hostility of the execu-
tors to plaintiff's claim on behalf of the estates. While the cause of the an-
tagonism is unknown, it is possible that the bank and the attorney were
motivated at least in part by a desire to protect their professional reputa-
tions. The bank's trust officer actually negotiated the sale and obtained the
price which plaintiff attacked as "grossly inadequate." The other executor
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was "not determinative of the jurisdictional issue."' " The court
then realigned the executors as parties plaintiff according to the
ultimate interest test and dismissed the action.17
In reversing and remanding the case the court of appeals ac-
knowledged the prevalence of the ultimate interest test but refused
to deem it controlling.' 8 The court relied on the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Smith v. Sperling9 and drew an analogy between
the heir-executor situation in Robilio and the stockholder-corporation
situation in Sperling.2" According to the court of appeals, Sperling
stands for two propositions: first, that the relevant test in the stock-
holder situation is whether the corporation is antagonistic to the en-
forcement of the claim and second, that the refusal of the corpora-
tion to sue is evidence of that antagonism.21 Both criteria were
found to be present in Robilio. The court noted that the rule ob-
taining in stockholders' suits "is not far removed" from the rule
applicable in other derivative actions.2 Finding that the rule of
Sperling could be applied to the situation in Robilio, the court of
appeals declined to limit Sperling to stockholders' derivative suits
until the Supreme Court had done so.m
The court's extension of Sperling to a non-stockholder situation
is not necessarily precluded by other Supreme Court decisions on re-
alignment which have utilized the ultimate interest test. A trustee
and his beneficiary,24 a lessor and his co-lessor,25 a mortgagee and
its mortgagor,28 and a parent corporation and its subsidiary, 7 all
advised (or at least permitted) plaintiff's mother to accept the price. Pos-
sibly they interpreted the attack on the transaction as an attack on their pro-
fessional competency and reacted accordingly. See note 11 supra.
Is 248 F. Supp at 616.
"' Especially when the nominal defendants, as here, are fiduciaries, will the
Court presume that their interests coincide with the interests of the de-
cedents' estates. It will take more than a showing of personal, hostile
attitudes to displace this presumption.
Id. 18 Id. 376 F.2d at 394.
Is 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
20 376 F.2d at 395.
" Id.; see Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957). Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in Sperling was directed against the second proposition, 354
U.S. at 105.
22 376 F.2d at 395.
" Id. at 395-96.
" Hamer v. New York Rys. Co., 244 U.S. 266 (1917).
"Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U.S. 542 (1925).
20 Dawson v. Columbia Ave Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178 (1905).
Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, 254 U.S. 77 (1920).
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of whom had the same legal interests as against the real defendants,
have been realigned so as to oust jurisdiction. In none of these
cases, however, were the parties actually antagonistic to each other.
The possibility of antagonism was negated by findings of collusion
to create jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist.2 8 The
assertion by the plaintiff of a claim which is properly the claim of
the nominal defendant has supported a finding of collusion, 2 as has
a request by the nominal defendant in his answer that the prayer for
relief be granted.30 Admission in the complaint that a party has been
joined as a defendant because joinder as a plaintiff would defeat
diversity has been taken as an admission of collusion.3 These cases
suggest that the Supreme Court has consistently applied the ultimate
interest test where the facts of the case create a suspicion that the
parties have collusively arranged alignment so as to confer jurisdic-
tion on the federal courts. It may be said that the ultimate interest
test, as applied, is a defensive device to defeat collusive expansion of
diversity jurisdiction. 2
The antagonism test developed in the stockholders' cases takes a
functional approach to the problem of alignment. Antagonism, for
the purposes of alignment, is not the subjective state of hostility or
8 In Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905), the
Court found that a suit brought by a mortgagee to compel a Georgia city to
perform its contract with the Georgia mortgagor was brought "solely for
the purpose of reopening in the United States Court a controversy which had
been decided against it in the courts of the State," and ordered dismissal.
"8See Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941) (mortgagee
sought to establish that a lease given by the mortgagor was binding upon the
assignee of the lessee); Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union,
254 U.S. 77 (1920) (parent corporation sued to enjoin the union from em-
ploying violence and intimidation in a strike at a subsidiary's plant); Hamer
v. New York Rys. Co., 244 U.S. 266 (1917) (bondholders sued to enforce a
judgment which the trustee had secured against the defaulting issuer).
" Hamer v. New York Rys. Co., 244 U.S. 266, 274 (1917).
" Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U.S. 542, 543 (1925).
12In two cases involving similar fact situations, the Supreme Court in-
voked the ultimate interest test to preserve federal jurisdiction where it would
not exist if the antagonism test were applied. Sharpe v. Bonham, 224 U.S.
241 (1912) and Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U.S. 32 (1911) involved a dispute over
church properties between the national Presbyterian Church in the United
States and a dissident group of Tennessee Presbyterians. The parties whose
alignment was at issue were the holders of legal title to the properties. In
both cases, they were members of the "national" faction. Notwithstanding
their personal antagonism to the dissidents, the title holders were aligned
with them in actions brought by out-of-state members of the national faction.
The Supreme Court refused to permit alignment, holding that the title-
holders were at law neutral stakeholders in the dispute and should not be
realigned as parties plaintiff so as to destroy diversity.
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personal animosity but the objective fact of "real collision" between
the parties"3 as revealed "by the pleadings and the nature of the
dispute."34 The Supreme Court has attempted neither to delve into
the motives of corporate directors nor to determine whether they
harbor personal animosity toward the complaining stockholder. 35
Instead the Court has looked to the conduct of the management and
to the position they have taken on behalf of the corporation in the
pleadings. The refusal of directors to sue"6 and the denial of an
opportunity for the complaining stockholder to present his charges
to the directors have been held to constitute sufficient antagonism to
defeat realignment.3 7 Antagonism may also be established if the
corporation unites with the real defendants in filing pleadings which
deny the plaintiff's charges of wrongdoing.38 In short, "There is
antagonism whenever the management is aligned against the stock-
holder and defends a course of conduct which he attacks.13
9
Judicial acceptance of Robilio need not abrogate ultimate interest
as the general test for realignment. The ultimate interests of the
parties will continue to be the basis for realignment but with an
exception recognized where antagonism is actually present. In
Robilio the sterile application of the ultimate interest test would
have created a danger of substantial injustice to the plaintiff. The
effect of the district court's decision would have been to compel the
New York plaintiff to bring her action in the courts of Tennessee.
With the Tennessee executors and defendants vigorously denying
the unfairness of the transaction, the possibility of prejudice to
plaintiff's claim cannot be overlooked. There can be little doubt
that the "matter in controversy" was in reality "between citizens of
different states."40 Application of the antagonism test merely recog-
nized the existence of that controversy and preserved federal juris-
diction in an appropriate situation.
WILLIAM V. MCPHERSON, JR.
"Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1957).
"Id. at 97.
"The Court noted in Sperling that the refusal to take action which con-
stituted antagonism might have been made "for any number of reasons."
354 U.S. at 96.
"354 U.S. at 95.
Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579, 588 (1905).
"Venner v. Great Northern Ry., 209 U.S. 24, 32 (1908).
"Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 95 (1957).1"28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
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